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d e sPiTe PosiTiVe exPeCTaTioNs,  cyber-insurance 
products have failed to take center stage in the 
management of IT security risk. Market inexperience, 
leading to conservatism in pricing cyber-insurance 
instruments, is often cited as the primary reason for 
the limited growth of the cyber-insurance market. In 
contrast, here we provide a demand-side explanation 
for why cyber-insurance products have not lived up to 
their initial expectations. We highlight the presence 
of information asymmetry between customers and 
providers, showing how it leads to overpricing cyber-
insurance contracts and helps explain 
why cyber insurance might have failed 
to deliver its promise as a cornerstone 
of IT security-management programs. 
Technological controls often lag 
hackers’ skills at circumvention. As a 
result, residual IT security risks can-
not be completely eliminated through 
technological advancement alone. 
Investment models9 of information 
security suggest that residual IT secu-
rity risks are transferable to a willing 
party through cyber insurance. Aca-
demic research2 also corroborates the 
economic value of cyber insurance in 
managing the cyber risks integral to a 
firm’s operations. Cyber insurance re-
fers to insurance contracts designed 
to mitigate liability issues, property 
loss and theft, data damage, loss of in-
come from network outage and com-
puter failures, Web-site defacement, 
and cyberextortion.12 Current cyber-
insurance products tend to provide 
three basic types of coverage: liability 
arising from theft of data; remediation 
in response to the breach; and legal 
and regulatory fines and penalties.1 
The size of the U.S. cyber-insurance 
market (annual premiums) was expect-
ed to reach $2.5 billion by 2005,11 and 
insurance giants like AIG and Chubb 
created numerous cyber-insurance 
products for managing IT risk. Howev-
er, IT managers still show little interest 
in cyber insurance for their risk-man-
agement programs; in 2008, the size of 
cyber-insurance market was estimated 
at $450 million.1 The 2006 CSI/FBI 
computer crime and security survey8 
reported that although firms use cyber 
insurance more than before, the annu-
al rate of increase is not substantial; re-
spondents indicating utilization of cy-
ber-insurance products increased from 
25% to 29% between 2005 and 2006. 
Scant attack-loss data, lack of prod-
uct-market experience, and account-
ing difficulties are the most common-
ly cited reasons for the market’s slow 
growth. These factors have led to con-
servatism by providers that err on the 
safe side by overpricing their products. 
However, in a competitive market, 
Doi:10.1145/1592761.1592780
Proposed contracts tend to be overpriced 
because insurers are unable to anticipate 
customers’ secondary losses. 
BY tRiDiB BanDYoPaDhYaY, ViJaY s. mooKeRJee, anD Ram c. Rao 
Why it 
managers 
Don’t Go 
for cyber-
insurance 
Products 
contributed articles
november 2009  |   vol.  52  |   no.  11  |   communications of the acm     69
overpricing is generally corrected over 
time, as risks/uncertainties are better 
understood. However, even after more 
than a decade of commercialization, 
cyber-insurance products remain un-
derutilized. Here, we argue that the 
demand-side problem with cyber in-
surance is deeper than the supply-side 
problem. Moreover, unless the former 
is addressed, it is unlikely to correct 
itself naturally over time. 
We further highlight the difference 
between the way a cyber-insurance 
contract is structured and the way it 
is used by IT managers, exploring the 
decisions behind a disclosure and an 
indemnity claim of a breach. We dif-
ferentiate the types of breach based 
on the way they affect firms. We also 
explain how they might alter the con-
tract-intended claiming behavior of 
IT managers. When insurers are un-
aware of such off-contract behavior 
or choose to not incorporate such be-
havior in pricing their offerings, infor-
mation asymmetry prevails in cyber-
insurance contracts. The result is an 
overpriced cyber-insurance contract 
and less risk being transferred. 
Disclosure and claim of 
a Realized Breach 
With the help of an event study, H. 
Cavusoglu et al.6 showed that publicly 
disclosed IT security breaches reduce 
breached firms’ stock prices, at least 
in the short term, because breaches 
convey questionable health of an IT 
security program to stakeholders, who 
then downgrade their risk perception 
of the firm. Elsewhere, K. Campbell 
et al.5 showed that investors discrimi-
nate against the type of breach in valu-
ing a breach’s economic effect. It is 
not surprising that the CSI/FBI com-
puter crime and security survey8 found 
that only a fraction of the realized 
breaches are publicly disclosed. Firms 
apparently use discretion in disclos-
ing realized breaches, depending on 
the requirements of legal compliance, 
types of breach, professional norms, 
and accounting materiality. 
Suppose there is no regulatory re-
quirement for disclosure. When a 
firm lacks cyber-insurance coverage, 
the information flow regarding a real-
ized breach remains strictly internal 
to the firm (see Figure 1). On the other 
hand, if the firm has a cyber-insurance 
contract in place, it is able to claim its 
losses from a breach, but the claiming 
process involves additional external 
organizations. The increased infor-
mation flow through external firms 
greatly affects the firm’s ability to keep 
breach information private. Integrat-
ing these ideas with insight from H. 
Cavusoglu et. al.6 and K. Campbell et. 
al.,5 consider the following observa-
tions about claiming indemnity from 
IT security breaches: 
The grapevine. Word of an undis-
closed breach can reach stakehold-
ers indirectly via interorganizational 
grapevines and independent analysts; 
Stakeholder perception. As a subse-
quent effect of the breach, a firm may 
also suffer secondary loss in terms of 
reduced stakeholder (investors and 
customers) valuation; and 
Managers’ decisions. Because breach 
information might trigger further sec-
ondary losses, IT managers’ decisions 
(whether or not to file a claim) depend 
on the primary and secondary losses, 
as weighed against the contract’s po-
tential indemnity payout. 
Breaches and Losses 
Because the process of reclamation 
through cyber-insurance contracts in-
volves compromise, post-breach defi-
nitions are pertinent, starting with the 
breach: 
Symptomatic. A breach is symptom-
atic when a firm is breached through 
exploitation of firm-specific vulner-
abilities (such as hackers in 2005 ac-
cessing the T.J. Maxx stores database 
of customer credit and debit card in-
formation, an exploitation of the vul-
figure 1. information flow in a cyber-insurance claim process. 
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nerabilities of the stores’ data-storage 
arrangements). Such compromises 
suggest questionable health of a 
firm’s security program. Consequent-
ly, stakeholders downgrade their per-
ception of the firm’s IT security; 
Systemic. A systemic breach occurs 
when the affected firm has no reason-
able or even known way to defend it-
self against a new threat vector, espe-
cially when the threat is transmitted 
through the business networks; for ex-
ample, in January 2004, the MyDoom 
virus spread primarily via email and se-
verely slowed or shut down email serv-
ers with excess traffic (http://reviews.
cnet.com/4520-6600_7-5118745-1.
html). In this case, stakeholders do 
not alter their perception of a firm’s IT 
security for systemic breaches, IT se-
curity programs plan only for known 
threats, and firms are all understood 
to be part of the internetworked glob-
al economy where such unknowns are 
always possible; 
Public. A breach is public if it is pub-
licly observed (such as a Web page be-
ing defaced), or an observable distrib-
uted denial-of-service attack disables 
a firm’s e-commerce transactions or is 
disclosed through legal requirements 
or accounting norms (such as the Cali-
fornia disclosure requirement for loss 
of customer data and accounting ma-
terial loss). By this definition, breaches 
that are not made public are private. 
Here are the potential losses: 
Primary. Breaches lead to primary 
loss (such as direct loss of informa-
tion or data and operating loss). As 
an uncontrollable first-degree effect 
arising from the unuse, disuse, abuse, 
and misuse of information assets, a 
primary loss arises under all breach 
scenarios, or under all combinations 
of public/private and systemic/symp-
tomatic breaches; and 
Secondary. A secondary loss is a sec-
ond-degree effect, indirectly triggered 
by information concerning a firm’s 
security inflicting further losses14 un-
der certain contingent scenarios (see 
Figure 2). Such losses include indi-
rectly lost or diminished reputation, 
goodwill, consumer confidence, com-
petitive strength, credit rating, and/or 
customer churn. 
With a cyber-insurance contract in 
place, the compromised firm claims 
the primary loss from a public breach, 
though the secondary loss occurs any-
way. The firm also claims its losses for 
systemic breaches but does not incur 
secondary loss. For a private symptom-
atic breach, the secondary loss could 
occur but only if the firm chooses to 
file a claim, as in Figure 2. IT managers 
thus realize that situations could arise 
where the claiming decision and hence 
potential indemnity payout must be 
weighed against the sum of the prima-
ry and secondary loss. The secondary 
losses could be subjectively estimated 
with the help of extant research out-
comes5,6,14 or assessed/perceived by ex-
periential or other benchmarking pro-
cesses by the firm’s IT managers. 
Armed with such foresight, the 
managers could revise the deductible 
for the optimal cyber-insurance con-
tract, in turn influencing the amount 
of insurance that is purchased. 
altered claiming strategy 
Considering claiming strategy, we be-
gin with a basic insurance contract 
characterized by cyber-risk-specific 
circumstances of potential breach 
and loss scenarios. The firm faces an 
arbitrarily distributed primary loss x 
we assume is transparently known to 
the insurer. Note that this assumption 
is significant, as it neutralizes all cited 
and accepted difficulties of cyber in-
surance in our treatment. That is, our 
insight is valid irrespective of the cor-
rectness of the friction in the cyber-
insurance market. 
The insurer presents a deductible 
(d)-based cyber-insurance contract 
that can be bought for an up-front 
premium (P), with the promise that 
primary losses greater than d will be 
compensated in full by the indemnity 
payment (I) (see Figure 3). The pre-
mium P decreases as the deductible 
d increases (see Figure 4), a standard 
observation concerning insurance 
contracts. In practice, the premium 
P also includes a market-loading fac-
tor that takes care of contract-writing 
costs, as well as other overhead, in-
cluding profit margins, if there are 
any. Figures 3 and 4 together depict 
the presented contract and the con-
tract-intended claiming behavior of 
the insured firm. 
The prospect firm must optimize 
and communicate a unique optimal 
deductible (d*) to the insurer. The de-
ductible then fixes the premium (P*) to 
be paid up front. However, an attempt 
to arrive at a unique optimal deduct-
ible d* must consider and consolidate 
several scenarios: 
Systemic and Public breach. The 
firm could submit a claim as per the 
contract, in case it realizes a systemic 
breach (no secondary loss) or public 
breach (the secondary loss occurs au-
tomatically); and 
Symptomatic breach. Because a 
symptomatic breach suggests lack of 
awareness, inadequate technology 
control, failure to observe policy or 
procedure, lack of manager oversight, 
or insider breach, one of the following 
options is pertinent: 
If the firm discloses the breach, it  ˲
has a symptomatic public breach for 
which a decision to submit a claim 
could follow; 
If the firm decides not to disclose  ˲
the breach, the decision criterion is 
further binary: 
It could receive a claim for prima- ˲
ry losses from the breach but incur the 
expected secondary loss or 
It might not claim the primary  ˲
loss, avoid the secondary loss, or forgo 
the indemnity payout. 
Assume the act of claiming the  ˲
symptomatic private breach reveals 
the breach to the stakeholders with 
probability p, and that the resultant 
(adverse) revision of the IT security risk 
costsa the firm y. Thus the expected 
a Here we assume that an IT security breach 
yields a fixed amount of downward risk revi-
sion by stakeholders. We also separately ana-
lyzed the case (not included here) in which 
figure 2. secondary losses from a realized breach. 
Private breach Public breach
symptomatic breach depends on claiming decision (Probabilistic?) Yes
systemic breach no no
secondary Loss scenario
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secondary loss is py. Clearly, the firm 
has no reason to claim for losses up to 
r = d + py. By the second binary crite-
rion, all symptomatic private breaches 
causing primary loss of magnitude 
between d and r are now likely to be 
unclaimed (see Figure 5). Note that r, 
not the contracted deductible d, is the 
de facto deductible for the symptom-
atic private breaches. Assuming that a 
portion of the realized breaches would 
be symptomatic private breaches, the 
unique optimized deductible d* lies 
somewhere between d and r (d < r). 
This happens for any arbitrary deduct-
ible d the firm might choose. The over-
all optimized deductible d* the firm 
must optimally use is always greater 
than d. More important, whenever a 
cyber-insurance contract with an arbi-
trary deductible d is operationalized at 
d*, the insured firm stands to lose part 
of the expected indemnity payout over 
the contract horizon; see Figure 5 for 
the location of this unique deductible. 
Only when the firm faces no sec- ˲
ondary loss or symptomatic private 
breaches (or both), d and d* coin-
cide, and the insured firm exhibits 
contract-intended behavior under all 
circumstances. Two interesting ob-
servations follow when a firm selec-
tively uses the contracted or de facto 
deductible depending on the type of 
realized breach: 
The higher the secondary loss, the  ˲
farther apart are d and r, meaning d 
and d* are farther apart as well; and 
A greater proportion of symptom- ˲
atic private breaches over the contract 
horizon increases the relative fre-
quency when the de facto deductible r 
(not the contract intended d) are used. 
This proportionally raises the amount 
of indemnity to be lost in the process, 
as in Figure 5. 
In effect, IT managers looking to-
ward the contract horizon anticipate 
too little expected indemnity from 
cyber-insurance products, so the con-
tract appears overpriced. For the same 
premium, the firm must use a higher 
overall deductible (see Figure 6). 
Figure 7 outlines the complete cy-
ber-insurance utilization scenario. No 
behavior and underclaiming behavior 
downward risk revision is a function of the 
magnitude of the primary loss. The fundamen-
tal insights from each case are the same.
figure 3. Relationship among loss, deductible, and indemnity in a cyber-insurance contract. 
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are thus rational for IT managers un-
der certain circumstances; their lack 
of interest in cyber-insurance products 
is rational as well. More important, an 
underclaiming strategy remains off-
contract, possibly heralding informa-
tion asymmetry between insurers and 
insured firms in the cyber-insurance 
market. 
information asymmetry 
Figure 8 outlines how the cyber-in-
surance market could move through 
possible scenarios of information 
asymmetry. Initially, the market could 
begin in naïve symmetry (quadrant 
I) where neither the insured nor the 
insurer knows the existence, nature, 
or magnitude of the secondary loss. 
As such, a cyber-insurance contract 
is written with business prudence in 
light of other established insurance 
markets. As the insured firm utilizes 
information assets in its business pro-
cesses, the value of asset unuse, dis-
use, abuse, and misuse become clear-
er. The insured firm realizes there 
could be attendant secondary losses 
following direct losses, as stakehold-
ers reassess the firm’s post-breach se-
curity. The insured firm now internal-
izes the ex-post definitions of the types 
of breach discussed earlier, and man-
agers formalize their optimized claim-
ing strategy for symptomatic private 
breaches also discussed earlier. This 
differs from the contract-intended 
is no longer overpriced, and the cyber-
insurance product is able to efficiently 
transfer more IT risk from insured to 
insurer. 
Risk transfer 
Employing the underclaiming strat-
egy for symptomatic private breaches 
has a profound effect on cyber insur-
ance as an instrument for transferring 
IT risk. Applicable for only some real-
ized breaches, it reduces the expected 
indemnity payout for a given level of 
premium, causing firms to find the 
instrument overpriced and hence un-
attractive. Since firms lack a credible 
way to communicate their off-contract 
claiming strategy under current con-
tract provisions, they are forced to pay 
for information asymmetry. 
A detailed analysis of our math-
ematical model suggests that a cyber-
insurance contract optimally trans-
fers a lower amount of IT security risk 
under information asymmetry. It also 
suggests that further reducing risk 
transfer depends on the level of sec-
ondary loss. It is important to realize 
that the major consumers of cyber-
insurance products are IT-intensive 
firms that could face relatively high 
secondary losses. 
Unfortunately, IT-intensive firms 
also likely find the proposed premium 
structure overpriced in the presence of 
information asymmetry, as in Figure 
5. On the other hand, firms with low 
IT security exposure may find cyber-
insurance products less overpriced in 
light of their lower secondary loss. 
We have shown that in the presence 
of secondary loss in symptomatic pri-
vate breaches, the optimal deductible 
d* is between d and r, as in Figure 5. 
Further analysis shows the smaller 
behavior, and the market moves from 
naïve symmetry to information asym-
metry (quadrant II). 
Under information asymmetry, ei-
ther the insured firm fails to credibly 
signal its off-contract behavior or the 
insurer ignores the signal while struc-
turing the cyber-insurance contract. 
Either way, the market is in a state of 
information asymmetry, and the in-
sured firm pays for the ensuing inef-
ficiency. 
The cyber-insurance market is, in 
part, locked in a state of information 
asymmetry. Only when the insurer 
considers the fact that the insured 
firm selectively uses the contracted 
and de facto deductibles when pricing 
the contract, does the market move 
to information symmetry (quadrant 
III). When the insurer corrects its pre-
mium structure this way, the contract 
figure 8. information asymmetry and market transition.
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the ratio of secondary loss to the de-
ductible, the lower is the relative over-
pricing of a cyber-insurance product. 
Thus, it appears that managers make 
a rational choice when using cyber-
insurance products with high deduct-
ible d such that the effect of relative 
overpricing on their contracts is mini-
mized. IT managers tend to self-in-
sure the smaller losses yet attempt to 
provide assurance to their stakehold-
ers of low-probability catastrophic 
breaches.b
This analysis suggests that firms 
with IT-intensive business processes 
find themselves better off self-insur-
ing a high proportion of their cyber-
risk, whereas those with low-intensity 
IT processes could find cyber-insur-
ance products less pricey under to-
day’s market conditions. In light of 
these outcomes, it becomes apparent 
why cyber insurance, as a market in-
strument, has seen little utilization 
or growth as a financial instrument in 
managing firms’ IT security risk. 
outlook 
The cyber-insurance market is charac-
terized by information asymmetry in 
contracts resulting in the suboptimal 
transfer of IT risk. From a market per-
spective, moving to information sym-
metry (Figure 8, quadrant III) is desir-
able. Because insured firms pay the 
price for information asymmetry (quad-
rant II), a move to information symme-
try necessarily increases the utility of 
the insured firm, with other conditions 
the same. However, the same may not 
hold for the insurer. A detailed analysis 
of the contingency tree (see Figure 7) 
suggests that under certain conditions 
(such as significant secondary loss) the 
insurer is better off under information 
asymmetry. Under other conditions, 
the insurer could be better off under 
information symmetry. This means the 
insurer would find it beneficial to lower 
premiums and thus grow the market 
for cyber insurance. 
b That firms buy cyber insurance with high de-
ductibles was also pointed out by the IT direc-
tor of a Dallas firm during a discussion with us 
at the University of Texas, Dallas. He explained 
that firms often buy cyber insurance to allay 
investors’ fear of major losses from IT security 
breaches yet depend on the policies, proce-
dures, and technical controls of IT security to 
manage more frequent but smaller losses.
Firms with a significant amount 
of IT in their core business processes 
largely constitute the demand side of 
the cyber-insurance market. The mar-
ket is thus relatively homogeneous 
with respect to (high) secondary loss, 
and the insurer is better off in a mar-
ket characterized by information 
asymmetry. This situation suggests 
that market mechanisms alone may 
not produce information symmetry in 
the cyber-insurance market. Because 
insured firms likely utilize high lev-
els of deductible in cyber-insurance 
contracts and do not claim small yet 
frequent losses, the accumulation of 
claim data suffers. Lack of claim data 
may be one reason why after even the 
past 10 years, cyber insurance is not a 
major component of corporate IT se-
curity initiatives. On the other hand, 
the relatively small size of the market 
keeps the costs of writing cyber-insur-
ance contracts high, forcing insurers 
to impose high margins on individual 
contracts. Unless it expands, insurers 
cannot gain more experience or accu-
mulate significant actuarial data and 
feel no pressing motivation to move 
to information symmetry. This could 
mean the market stays locked in infor-
mation asymmetry. 
The structural problem with the 
market can be resolved if secondary 
loss were included in contracts. Ex-
otic bundled contracts (individual 
contracts for primary and secondary 
losses designed in tandem and bun-
dled together) could be a viable solu-
tion. It might take care of the fact that 
the primary (secondary) losses are 
determined before (after) the breach, 
so IT managers are able to take inde-
pendent decisions concerning disclo-
sures and claims. Even so, valuing sec-
ondary loss is more challenging than 
valuing primary loss, so there appears 
no easy solution, even if bundled con-
tracts are written. 
It is possible that along with in-
creased regulatory compliance and 
oversight, the relative proportion of 
private breaches decreases, along 
with the information asymmetry be-
tween insurer and insured. Similarly, 
separating contracts on the basis of 
disclosure (compliance or discretion-
ary) might also be a move in a positive 
direction. However, contracts offered 
by major insurers today are either ar-
chitecture-oriented (such as a network 
breach), asset-based (such as a data 
breach), attack-specific (such as virus-
es and worms), or liability-focused. No 
offered contract considers secondary 
loss or accommodates the complexi-
ties of a firm’s decision to file a claim 
in the face of secondary loss. It ap-
pears that without significant changes 
in the design of the contracts, there is 
little hope for the continued growth of 
the overall cyber-insurance market.  
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